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A B S T R A C T  
 
DESIGN OF NONLINEAR OBSERVER FOR CHAOTIC 
MESSAGE TRANSMISSION 
 
Chaos is  an interesting nonlinear phenomena that  occurs in wide 
variety of fields. A significant amount of research was devoted to 
understanding chaos and its properties. After that, researchers focused 
on searching for possible application a reas for chaos to utilize its  
properties. The need to increase the security of a communication system 
is considered as a perfect match for chaos and its several  properties , 
yielding chaotic communication.  
In this thesis, chaotic communication is approache d from a control  
theory perspective.  Specifically,  three nonlinear observers are designed 
to extract message encrypted in a chaotic  communication signal. The 
design and stability analysis is presented for the first observer, and the 
other observers are presented as modifications to  the first one.   
Extensive numerical  simulations are performed to demonstrate the 
viability of the proposed observers. Robustness of the observers to noise, 
additive disturbances, and parametric mismatch, and security of the 
observers are demonstrated numerically.   
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Ö ZE T  
 
KAOTİK MESAJ İLETİMİ İÇİN DOĞRUSAL  OLMAYAN 
GÖZLEMCİ TASARIMI  
 
Kaos, çok geniş ve çeşitli  alanda varlık gösterebilen, ilgi çekici 
lineer olmayan bir olaydır.  Kaosu ve onun özelliklerini anlamak için 
dikkat çekici sayıda araştırma bu konuya adanmıştır. Daha sonra, 
araştırmacılar kaosun özell iklerinden faydalanabilecekleri muhtemel 
uygulama alanlarını  tespit etmeye odaklanmışlardır.  Haberleşme 
sistemlerinin güvenliğini sağlamak adına kaos üreteçlerinin kullanılması ,  
kaosun özelliklerinin pratik hayata geçiri lmesi için çok önemli bir fırsat  
oluşturmuştur .   
Bu tezde,  kaotik haberleşme konusuna kontrol teorisi açısından 
yaklaşılmıştır. Özell ikle, kaotik sinyallerle şifrelenmiş mesajın tekrar 
ortaya çıkarılması için üç adet lineer olmayan gözlemci tasarlanmıştır.  
İlk gözlemci için tasarım ve kararlıl ık  analizi detaylıca verilmiş, diğer 
gözlemciler için ise i lk gözlemci ile arasındaki değişiklikler 
belirtilmiştir.  
Önerilen  gözlemcilerin başarımlarının doğrulanması amacıyla  çok 
sayıda simülasyon yapılmıştır. Ayrıca gözlemcilerin gürültüye, ek 
bozulmalara ve parametre hatalarına karşı direnci ve güvenlik analizleri  
ispat edilmiştir.  
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C HA PT E R  1  
 
I N T R OD U C TI ON  
 
Security and privacy of personal information is becoming an 
extremely important subject day by day. Growth in using mobile 
communication devices and the internet for personal communications 
make data encryption and security indispensable [1],  [2]. The main 
reason for this is that the information being sent from a transmitter has 
to be ensured to be free of listening by unwanted listeners. While 
classical cryptology systems are being used  for security and privacy, the 
pioneering works by Pecora and Carroll introduced the possibility of 
synchronization and control of chaotic systems  which resulted in  using 
chaotic signals for secure and private communication [3], [4], [5], [6], 
[7],  [8].  
Before discussing chaotic communication, we would to like give 
brief information about Chaos.  Chaos, which comes from Greek word 
khaos  meaning “abyss, that which gapes wide open, is vast and empty”, 
is a very popular, universal and robust phenomenon in many nonlinear 
systems.  The first  note about the possibility of existence of chaotic 
behavior in mechanical systems was put into words by the great 
Mathematician Poincaré  in 1892 [9]. After Lorenz published his paper  
[10], chaos came into prominence among the researchers. 
Misunderstanding between chaos and noise in engineering community 
resulted in losing about twenty years [11], and the first studies on chaos 
started nearly 1980s.   
Chaos is  commonly used in a wide variety of fields  such as 
meteorology, aerodynamics and turbulence modeling, chemical reactions 
(Belousov-Zhabotinskii reaction),  nonlinear electronic circuits (Van Der 
Pol Oscillators, Chua’s Circuit), ecology, biology and population 
evolution, observed time series like electrocardiogram, 
electroencephalogram, and financial  data  [12].  
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There are three basic fundamentals for chaotic systems;  
 Dependency on the initial conditions:  Chaotic systems  are 
sensitively dependent on the initial conditions.  
 Long term unpredictabili ty: They are quite complex and it is 
usually impossible to predict the signal over longer times.  
 Condition of not being random: In spite of impossible 
prediction, there is an arrangement in itself.   
Besides complexity and sensitivity on the initial conditions , 
chaotic systems are wideband, noise -like, irregular, a-periodic, and 
uncorrelated (i.e.  orthogonal) . And despite these,  chaos can be observed 
in rather simple dynamical systems  [13].  
Chaotic systems are dynamical systems which defy or resist  
synchronization [14] . Uncorrelation between two identical autonomous 
chaotic systems ’  t rajectories can be observed to be deviating 
significantly even if  they start  from very close init ial values. That shows 
us that it  is quite tough to set up identical  and synchronized chaotic 
systems in laboratory [3]. The seminal works by Pecora and Carroll 
demonstrate that there is  a way to achieve synchronization and  control of 
the chaotic systems  [3]. They achieved this by linking two chaotic 
systems via a common signal or signals  [3].  
Based on Pecora and Carrol’s works, a chieving synchronization is 
possible for a transmitter-receiver system. As can be seen in Figure 1, a 
transmitter-receiver system commonly consists of two main parts  where 
the first part is the drive system that generates the chaotic signals, and 
the second part  is the response system which receives the transmitted 
signals.  The usually preferred way of synchronizing two systems is 
achieved by generating an input signal via the drive system, and then 
sending signal as an input to the receiver part.  To make the information 
crypted, the information is transformed by the drive system in such a 
way that is specific for this system, and the response system, which is an 
authorized one, converts the transmitted signal to the original message 
signal provided the prior knowledge of the specific transmission 
parameters of the drive system. The level of the difficulty encountered 
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by the unwanted listeners , who try to decode the information signal ,  
classifies the security of the information.   
 
Figure 1. A general block diagram of chaotic oscil lator in a secure 
                communication system 
 
Despite being a relatively new field ,  a significant amount of 
research was devoted to chaos communication , mostly to use it  
effectively in a wide variety of areas. Since chaotic based secure 
communication is relatively simpler in view of practicing i ts hardware 
implementation [15] and it is highly unpredictable  than the conventional  
schemes (i.e. , it  has higher security) , several aspects of  chaotic schemes 
are being investigated [16].  Using chaotic signals for secure 
communication also increases the performance of the communication 
system; see [17].  There are several  approaches in the literature for th e 
security of the communication . Most of these approaches are based on 
conventional encryption and security schemes . However, hardware 
implementations of these approaches are usually very complicated for 
the conventional communication schemes  [15], [16], [18].  In  addition to 
ensure the privacy of a system, the integrity of the transmitted message 
must be ensured by secure communication.  
A comparison between the Chaotic Property and Cryptographic  
Property is listed in the Table 1  [19]. Both chaotic systems and 
cryptographic systems have nonlinear transformation but though 
cryptographic systems have finite number of state and iterations,  chaotic 
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systems have infinite.  Both systems are so sensitive to the initial 
conditions or secret key.  
 
Chaotic property Cryptographic property Description 
Chaotic system: 
Nonlinear transformation 
Infinite number of state  
Infinite number of 
iterations 
Pseudo-chaotic system: 
Nonlinear transformation 
Finite number of state 
Finite number of 
iterations  
 
Ergodicity Confusion 
The output has the 
same distribution 
for any input  
Sensitivity to initial  
conditions/control 
parameter  
Diffusion with a small 
change in the 
plaintext/secret  key 
A small  deviation 
in the input can 
cause a large 
change at  the 
output  
Mixing property 
Diffusion with a small 
change in one plain-block 
of the whole plain text  
A small  deviation 
in the local  area 
can cause a large 
change in the 
whole space 
Structure complexity 
Algorithm (attack) 
complexity 
A simple process 
has a very high 
complexity 
 
Table 1.  Comparison between chaos and cryptography properties   
 
Privacy of the communications is approached by using chaotic 
signal masking technique which was introduced in [20] and [21]. Besides 
the chaotic signal masking (CM) there are three more modulation 
schemes in the l iterature such as Chaos On-Off Keying (COOK), Chaos 
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Shift Keying (CSK) and Differential  Chaos Shift Keying (DCSK). We 
will give brief information about these schemes later on.  
Although there are numerous circuits which are developed for 
chaotic scenarios, the most investigated and implemented autonomous 
systems are Chua oscillator, Rössler Oscillator and Lorenz Chaotic 
System. These systems’ chaotic dynamics are well  known  [22].  
Implemented Chua circuit and also Lorenz based circuit models has the 
abili ty to transmit either analog or digital forms of the signals. Chua 
circuit is a commonly used circuit in the literature but if we compare the 
performance of Lorenz based circuit with Chua’s circuit , it  will be 
observed that  Lorenz’s circuit is better  in performance [23].  
Broadband chaotic oscillations can be produced by Lorenz Chaotic  
System and all the properties of chaotic systems such as being noise -
like, and dependence on the initial cond itions and system parameters,  
being difficult to estimate are obtained.  As a result, we can use Lorenz 
System for secure communication. In this system, the synchronization is 
highly robust to perturbations in  the drive signal as shown numeri cally 
in [24].  
This thesis focuses on designing observers for message extracting 
from chaotic communication systems. Specifically, we propose three new 
nonlinear observers for chaotic communication systems and apply these 
ideas to the Lorenz Chaotic System. This system was proposed 40 years 
ago for modeling two-dimensional fluid convection by Edward Lorenz of 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Massachusetts ,  MA, USA 
[10]. The stability analysis of t he first observer is examined by 
Lyapunov’s stability theorem (Lyapunov’s Direct Method) which states 
if we measure the system’s total energy, and if the rate of the change of 
the energy is decreasing, then the system’s states will finally reach an 
equilibrium point [25]. Although i t  has been always tough to analyze 
nonlinear systems, the most flexible,  intuitive, and powerful way is 
provided by Lyapunov based design techniques. The most important step 
of the analysis is to define the Lyapunov function whose time derivative 
will be evaluated.  
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This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 1 introduces some 
basic knowledge about chaos and communication and relationship 
between chaos and cryptography. Chapter 2 gives detailed informati on 
about chaos communication and its requirements. Chapter 3 presents our 
proposed nonlinear observer for chaotic message transmission. Finally,  
the thesis is summarized in Conclusion chapter and future works are 
determined.  
The contributions of this thes is are:  
 A nonlinear observer utilizing the integral of the signum of the 
observer error terms is designed for message extraction in a 
chaotic system. According to our best knowledge, the integral  
of the signum of the observer error terms was not utilized f or 
message extraction in a chaotic communication system before.  
 The second observer is obtained by replacing the signum term 
in the first  observer with hyperbolic tangent function. This 
observer is utilized for message extraction from a chaotic 
communication system for the first time in the li terature.  
 The third observer is  designed by replacing the signum function 
in the first  observer with saturation function. This is a novel 
observer.   
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C HA PT E R  2  
 
W HA T  I S  C HA OS  C OM M U N I C A T I ON?  
 
Studies on chaotic dynamical systems introduced the question 
“How can chaos be used in different fields?” At the beginning of the 
1990s, the answer was given as chaos communication . The main reason 
is that  despite the fact  that the dynamical system representations of 
chaotic systems are fairly simple the resulting/obtained chaotic behavior 
is complex. Other characteristics of chaotic signals ,  such as being 
irregular, aperiodic,  noise -like, uncorrelated, broadband, and long-term 
predictabili ty make them suitable for sub-fields of  communication 
systems like spread-spectrum communications, for multi -user 
communications, and especially for secure communications (i.e. , 
cryptography) [24],  [26].  
One of the main research problems chaotic communications is the 
synchronization of the transmitter and the receiver. The pioneering 
works of Pecora and Carroll [3], [4] which were the milestones of the 
synchronization problem, attracted several researchers to work on 
synchronization and also on control  of chaotic systems in various fields.  
 
 C o m m u n i c a t i o n  F u n d a m e n t a l s  a n d  S c h e m e s  2.1.
 
In this section, communication requirements and resources , and 
also potential of chaos in communication systems are discussed.  
The general structure of communication scheme is demonstrated in 
Figure 2. Source decoding, decryption, and channel decoding,   
demodulation have to be performed at  the receiver side to the received 
message to obtain the original (transmitted) message.  
 8 
 
 
Figure 2. General  Structure of a communication scheme  
 
 C o m m u n i c a t i o n  R e q u i r e m e n t s  a n d  2.1.1.
R e s o u r c e s  
 
This subsection provides information about requirements of a 
communication channel and its limitations.  
 
2 . 1 . 1 . 1 .   R e q u i r e m e n t s  
 
In a communication system, there is a transmitter which transmits 
the message/information to a receiver or a recipient.  Transmitter and 
receiver are usually located in different places. The message is 
transmitted by a physical media (i.e. , the communication channel). This 
channel has to have the  standard requirements such as being efficient,  
secure and robust .  Different blocks of a communi cation scheme 
implement these three requirements.  
 
2 . 1 . 1 . 1 . 1 .   E f f i c i e n c y   
 
Analog signals (such as sound, picture, and video signals) usually 
have a lot of redundancy. Uncompressed digital signals (such as text,  
 9 
 
sound or images) may be redundant as well. This redundancy can be 
cancelled by omitt ing unnecessary content from the information. 
Removing the unnecessary content of the signal before the transmission 
(i.e., forming an almost redundancy-free message) is achieved by a 
process called source encoding [27]. Analog schemes are not suitable for 
this encoding because it is a digital procedure and only digital data is 
suitable for this.  
 
2 . 1 . 1 . 1 . 2 .  S e c u r i t y   
 
The physical media,  which we transmit the signal over (i.e. , t he 
communication channel), is usually public which  means it  is  accessible 
by many receivers. If  the sender wants to prevent the message from 
unwanted listeners for security or privacy reasons,  cryptography will  be 
a solution. Encryption is applied to messa ge before the transmission so 
that  the message is aimed to be totally protected from unwanted listeners  
[28].  
 
2 . 1 . 1 . 1 . 3 .  R o b u s t n e s s   
 
The message is usually not transmitted over the transmission 
channel or the physical media directly.  Fo r example, al though the 
frequency of a speech signal is in the kilohertz region, one cannot 
transmit it  over a radio channel which is in megahertz region. So, t he 
message is mapped to signals  which can pass the given physical channel.  
This process is called modulation. It  has to be mentioned that  in general  
the transmitted and the received signals  are not same. Specifically,  the 
received signal is  corrupted because of filtering, nonlinear distortions, 
and interference from other signals  in the communication medium. In 
conclusion, the transmission should be robust to all anticipated channel 
distortions.  The first  method to increase robustness is  to choose a proper 
modulation scheme. Another way is to add a redundant signal to  the 
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transmit ted signal in a controlled way. This second method is called 
channel encoding and is one of the digital communication methods  [26].  
 
2 . 1 . 1 . 2 .  R e s o u r c e  S h a r i n g   
 
There are always various limitations to signal transmission 
because of the restrictions of the physical channel.  These are detailed 
below.  
 Bandwidth Limitation: Bandwidth limitation is caused by the 
physical communication channel. Although the channel can 
provide a bandwidth physically, there may be some 
restrictions due to technical or administrative constraints.  
 Imperfections: The received signal  is usually distorted 
because of attenuations,  multipath propagation and delays 
due to linear or nonlinear filtering, noise caused by nature 
or technical sources , and also interference from other 
received signals.  
 Publicity: Most of the physical channels are unsecure, thus 
the signals transmitted over these channels can be received 
by unwanted listeners.  
We can say that, while transmitting messages over a physical  
channel, there is always a limitation for capacity which means that the 
resources are limited. The communication system design has to provide 
an optimized model for these limited resources. Utilizing orthogonal 
signals is one way for this optimization. Thi s is done by assigning an 
orthogonal signal to each user of the physical communication channel.  
Another advantage of utilizing orthogonal signals is that one can 
separate the signals  that belong to different users easily.  For example,  
consider    and    which are orthogonal  if  
∫      
 
  
  
           (1) 
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where superscript * denotes complex conjugation.  Equation (1) implies a 
vanishing cross-correlation of    and   .  Fourier representations of these 
signals are given by 
       ∫                
 
  
 (2) 
 
for i=1, 2.  From Parseval’s  Theorem [29] ,  we can obtain  
∫      
 
  
  
        
 
  
∫        
       
 
  
 (3) 
 
From the duality property,  orthogonality in the time domain implies  
orthogonality in the frequency domain.  There are some ways to achieve 
orthogonality property in multi -user environments.  
 Signals disjoint in time:  Time Division Multiple Access 
(TDMA) is one way when one of the signals (i.e., either    
or   ) is equal to zero at any time.  
 Signals disjoint in frequency:  Frequency Division Mul tiple 
Access (FDMA) is another way to obtain orthogonality.  The 
expression in (3) is equal to zero if any of the Fourier 
representations of the signals  (        or       ) vanishes.  
 Uncorrelated signals:  Aside from TDMA and FDMA, Code 
Division Multiple Access (CDMA) is another way to use 
orthogonality. In CDMA, there is no obliga tion for signals 
to be disjoint  neither in time nor in frequency. 
 
 P o t e n t i a l  o f  C h a o s  i n  C o m m u n i c a t i o n  2.2.
 
After significant improvements in nonlinear dynamical systems, 
the chaotic communication applications have been understood more 
precisely.  These improvements motivate researchers for practical 
solutions and applications. There are three  main potential application 
areas. These three areas create three different behavioral  aspects  of 
chaotic signals.  
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 B r o a d - B a n d  A s p e c t   2.2.1.
 
As we mentioned before, chaotic signals are aperiodic because of 
their nature and they also have a continuous spectrum. Often, the 
spectrum shows significant strength over a wide  range of frequencies,  
i .e.,  the signals are broad band.  These spectral  properties let us design 
models for chaotic signals  [30].  
 It  should be noted that, one way to deal with channel 
imperfections is using broadband signals in communications . So that  
chaotic signals are appropriate candidates for spread -spectrum 
communications [1].  
 
 C o m p l e x i t y  A s p e c t   2.2.2.
 
As commonly stated in the literature chaotic signals are irregular 
and have a complex structure. When there is a minimal change in the 
initial conditions of a chaos generator ,  its output trajectory will be 
totally different. It is a good feature for secure communication because ,  
after longer time intervals , predicting the signals and guessing the 
structure of the generator become extremely difficult.  
As a result, cryptographic applications , which classically use 
highly complex and hard-to-predict signals, is considered as a potential  
application for chaos  [31], [32].  
 
 O r t h o g o n a l i t y  A s p e c t  2.2.3.
 
The autocorrelation functions of chaotic signals usually vanish so 
fast since they are aperiodic. They can  thus be assumed uncorrelated 
(i.e.,  orthogonal) when the signals are generated by different chaos 
generators or same generator with dif ferent init ial  conditions.  
Due to the orthogonality property,  the third potential application 
field for chaos is  multi -user communication applications.  Chaos-based 
solutions for conventional CDMA systems which use chaos generators 
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for the generation of spreading codes are better in the manner of 
performance then classical  approaches.  
 
 C h a o s  M o d u l a t i o n  S c h e m e s   2.3.
 
As we mentioned in the Introduction, there are four different chaos 
modulation schemes. Although Chaotic Masking scheme is  investigated 
in this thesis, brief information about other three schemes which are 
Chaos On-Off Keying, Chaos Sift Keying, and Differential Chaos Shift  
Keying will be given.  
 
 C h a o t i c  M a s k i n g  2.3.1.
 
The chaotic masking scheme is composed of  two identical chaotic  
systems. One of them is at  the receiver part and the other one is at the 
transmitter part . As demonstrated in Figure 3,  the transmitted message 
     is obtained by adding the chaotic mask signal to the message signal 
    .  The copy of the chaotic mask signal  ̂    is  produced by another but 
identical  chaotic system at the receiver part. When the difference 
between the transmitted signal      and chaotic mask signal  ̂    is zero,  
the recovered message signal  ̂    is equal to     .  
 
Figure 3. Chaotic Masking 
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If the channel is noise-free and the synchronization is perfect 
between the two systems then           .  When the difference between 
     and  ̂    is zero then  ̂        .  Finally,  we can conclude that  
 ̂        .   
 
 C h a o s  S h i f t  K e y i n g  2.3.2.
 
In Chaos Shift Keying (CSK) scheme, there are two statist ically 
similar attractors at  the transmitter part. These two systems with the 
same structure but different parameters generate two different chaotic 
signals which are       and      ,  respectively. In this scheme, the 
message signal should be digital signal.  Determination  output of which 
chaotic signal will be sent depends on the message si gnal’s bit which can 
be 0 or 1 [11],  [33].  
At the receiver end, correlation between the received signal and 
the reproduction of any of the two chaotic signals used in the transmitter 
is obtained. The synchronization e rror is used for recovering the message 
signal by low-pass filtering and thresholding. The block diagram model  
of this scheme is shown in  Figure 4.  
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Figure 4. Chaos Shift Keying 
 
 C h a o s  O n - O f f  K e y i n g  2.3.3.
 
Chaos On-off Keying (COOK) is another communication scheme 
which is very similar to CSK structurally.  Difference betwee n CSK and 
COOK is that  COOK uses only one chaotic signal while CSK uses two 
different chaotic signals. In COOK, the second signal is equal to 0. If the 
message signal is equal to 1 then the chaotic signal is transmitted, else 
no signal is transmitted. Demodulation procedure is same with CSK as 
shown in Figure 5.  
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Figure 5. Chaos On-Off Keying 
 
 D i f f e r e n t i a l  C h a o s  S h i f t  K e y i n g  2.3.4.
 
In this scheme, there are two sample functions which represent the 
bit to be transmitted . Reference signal is the first sample function and 
information signal is carried by the second sample function. If the 
reference signal is transmitted twice in successively, it  means that the 
message bit is 1. If  inverted copy of the chaotic signal is  transmitted 
after the original  chaotic signal then the message bit  is  0. In the 
receiver, these two sample functions’ correlation is used  with the help of 
a level comparator for decision.  
As we previously discussed, there should be a synchronization 
signal between the receiver and the transmitter in the first three chaos 
modulation schemes. On the contrary Differential  Chaos Shift Keying 
(DCSK) does not need a synchronizat ion signal.  So that we do not need a 
chaotic system at the receiver part . The same chaotic signal generated at 
the transmitter part  is used for transmitting and demodulating the 
message signal at the receiver part which is shown in Figure 6.  
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Figure 6. Differential Chaos Shift Keying  
 
 A d v a n t a g e s  a n d  D i s a d v a n t a g e s  o f  C h a o s -2.4.
b a s e d  E n c r y p t i o n  S c h e m e s  
 
In this sub-section, a comparison between the chaos based 
encryption schemes and traditional encryption schemes are listed. As we 
discussed earlier, chaos based encryption has more advantages than 
conventional encryption methods which are shown below [34]:  
 Although there is a requirement of digitizing the message in 
traditional encryption schemes because of being defined over 
integer number field,  chaos based encryption schemes can be 
used without this requirement since they can be defined over 
continuous number field. Because of being defined over 
continuous number field, chaos based encryption schemes can 
be used for encryption with more variety of functions.  
 The chaos based encryption schemes can be realized directly by 
hardware implementation of high speed analog compon ents but 
digital hardware must be used for implementation of traditional 
encryption schemes.  
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 There must be two circuits in traditional encryption scheme. 
The first one is for digital  encryption, the second one is for 
broadband modulation which is obtained form an analog circuit. 
But in chaos based encryption scheme, a single circuit is 
enough for both encoding and broadband modulation.   
 We need to mask a message with either non-periodic pseudo 
random waveforms which are generated by chaotic dynamics or 
pseudo-random sequences generated by traditional encryption 
schemes. The handicap of using pseudo-random sequences 
generated by traditional schemes is that  they will be periodic 
eventually (because of being implemented using digital 
hardware) since the periodicity of these sequences are limited 
by the number of bits which are generated by the state of the 
pseudo number sequence generator.  
The disadvantages of chaotic encryption schemes are as follows: 
 Since chaotic encryption is a relatively new field of res earch, 
its security is not proven totally.   
 Traditional communication schemes are better in the power 
efficiency, bandwidth efficiency and bit error rate performance 
than the chaos based efficiency.  
 
 S u m m a r y  2.5.
 
In this chapter, a survey of communication fundamentals, potential 
of chaos communication, and chaos modulation schemes are presented. 
The requirements of a communication channel and limitations because of 
the physical  channel are also provided.  
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C HA PT E R  3  
 
D E S I GN  OF N ON L I N E A R  OB S E R V E R S  FOR  
C HA OT I C  M E S S A GE  T R AN S M I S SI ON  
 
In this chapter, firstly, general Lorenz Chaotic System will be 
deeply investigated with some simulation results . Secondly,  novel 
nonlinear observers will be proposed. The design and the associated 
stability analysis will be given in detail for the first one, while the other 
two of them will  be presented as extensions to the first  one.  
 
 G e n e r a l  L o r e n z  S y s t e m  3.1.
 
General Lorenz chaotic system is defined by the following system 
of ordinary differential equations . Extensive numerical  simulations will  
also be presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of proposed observers. 
Finally,  security of our algorithm will be discussed briefly.  The 
governing equations of the system are;   
 
 ̇                 (4) 
                           ̇                        (5) 
     ̇                   (6) 
 
where     ,       and      are system states,  ,     and   are system 
parameters that define the Lorenz system.  
Typical parameters that  generates chaotic dynamics for this system 
are   = 10,   = 28 and   = 8/3. In Figure 7, waveforms of the system 
states are given for the above parameter and initial conditions  of      = 
10,      = 10 and      = 1,  and the attractors generated the signals shown 
in Figure 8.  
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Figure 7.      ,       and       
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(a)  
(b)  
(c)  
Figure 8. Chaotic attractors of Lorenz fo r given parameters. a) xy-plane 
              b) yz-plane c) xz-plane 
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 T h e  E f f e c t  o f  t h e  I n i t i a l  C o n d i t i o n s  3.1.1.
 
As mentioned before, chaotic systems are extremely sensitive to 
their initial conditions. If two identical  chaotic systems start with a 
small difference between their initial conditions, they will diverge from 
each other. This special feature is simulated for the Lorenz system  in (4) 
- (6). Initial conditions are now chosen as      = 10.001,      = 10 and 
     = 1.  Since the initial value of      was 10 and now chosen as 10.001,  
it  is only changed by 0.001, while keeping the initial values of      and 
     same. The states of      are demonstrated in Figure 9. It  is  trivial  
that a small difference in the initial conditions caused dramatic changes 
at the trajectory of      after the 30 t h  second.  
 
 
Figure 9. The above trajectory is for      = 10 and the below one is for  
                    = 10.001.  
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 T h e  E f f e c t  o f  t h e  S y s t e m  P a r a m e t e r  3.1.2.
 
There is a hypercube in the parameter space where the system is in 
the chaotic regime. When in the chaotic regime,  systems are sensitively 
dependent on the system parameters.  Making a change at a specific 
parameter can significantly affect  the chaotic behavior.  
In Figure 10, comparative simulation results for   = 28 and   = 35 
are shown. As you can see , a change in the “ ” parameter makes the 
chaotic behavior totally different .  
 
 
Figure 10. The Effect of the System Parameter . The above figure is  for    
                 = 28 is above and the below figure is for    = 35 
 
 N o n l i n e a r  O b s e r v e r  D e s i g n  3.2.
 
In this section, firstly, the dynamic model of the Lorenz System is 
given, secondly, the observer  design is investigated, and finally, stability 
analysis for this system is showed in detail. The simulation results based 
on these analys is are illustrated in Figures.  
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 D y n a m i c  M o d e l  o f  t h e  L o r e n z  S y s t e m  3.2.1.
 
In the case of chaotic masking, the dynamic model of the chaotic 
Lorenz system is given by following equations  
 
                     ̇                        (7) 
            ̇                          (8) 
  ̇              
 
 
     (9) 
 
where      is  the message signal .  For the Lorenz System      is 
considered as the output and it is the only signal that is available for use 
in the observer design. (i.e., it  is the only signal that is transmitted to 
the receiver part .) Similar to the previous studies in the l iterature, we 
assume that we know the structure of the Lorenz system (i .e., we know 
all the constant parameters).  In the observer design part,  the initial  
conditions of the drive system are not known.  We will design observers 
for     ,       and     .  Since the message signal is hidden –crypted–  in 
chaotic signal     ,  our overall objective is  to reconstruct the message 
signal      online from     .  
 
 O b s e r v e r  D e s i g n  3.2.2.
 
Based on the subsequent stabil ity analysis, we design the 
following nonlinear observer 
           ̇̂           ̂    ̂    (10) 
  ̇̂        ̂    ̂ (11) 
    ̇̂    ̂   
 
 
 ̂ (12) 
 
where  ̂   ,   ̂   ,   ̂    are the observer signals for          ,      ,  
respectively,  and  ̂    is the observed signal  that will  be designed 
subsequently.  It should be noticed that since      is available then we 
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used i t in the designs of  ̇̂   ,   ̇̂    and  ̇̂(t),  and did not utilize neither      
nor      in our observer design.  
To quantify the mismatch between the actual signals and the 
corresponding observer signals , we define observer errors  
  ̃       ̂ (13) 
  ̃      ̂ (14) 
   ̃      ̂.  (15) 
  
The observed message is designed as  [35]  
 ̂         [ ̃      ̃    ∫  ̃     
 
 
]         (16) 
 
where   and   are positive observer gains and      is a filter signal 
updated according to  
 ̇       ( ̃   ) with        (17) 
with    (.) being the standard signum function .  
 
 S t a b i l i t y  A n a l y s i s  3.2.3.
 
The stability analysis is conducted in two parts. In the first part, 
we will  prove the convergence of   ̃and  ̃ to zero, and in the second part, 
we will prove the convergence of  ̃ to zero and then conclude with 
proving the convergence of  ̂    to      (i .e.,   ̂         ).  
The time derivative of the observer error   ̃ is obtained as  
 ̇̃    ̇    ̇̂ 
          ̃    ̃  
(18) 
 
where (8) and (11) were utilized. The t ime derivative of the observer 
error  ̃ is obtained as  
 ̇̃    ̇    ̇̂ 
           ̃   
 
 
 ̃    
(19) 
where (9) and (12) were utilized.  
We now define a Lyapunov function, denoted by     ̃  ̃    ,  as  
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    ̃  ̃   
 
 
 ̃   
 
 
 ̃  (20) 
 
It  should be noted that     ̃  ̃       ̃  ̃.  The time derivative of    is 
obtained as  
 ̇    ̃ ̇̃   ̃ ̇̃ (21) 
and after substituting (18) and (19), we obtain  
  ̇     ̃
  
 
 
 ̃   
      ̃    ̃   
            (22) 
where (20) was utilized to obtain the last  line.  
After solving the above linear differential  inequality,  we can 
conclude that  ̃ and  ̃ goes to 0 exponentially fast.  After utilizing the fact  
that       is  a bounded function of time, we can conclude that  ̃     ̃    
 ̇̃     and  ̇̃    are bounded functions of time. From (22), it  is  clear that  
 ̃     and  ̃    are square integrable  functions. This concludes the first part 
of the proof.  
We now define an auxiliary error-like signal, denoted by       , 
as  
    ̇̃   ̃.  (23) 
 
We will  now obtain the dynamics of     .  If  we take the time 
derivative of (13), we obtain 
 ̇̃    ̇    ̇̂  
 
(24) 
and after substitut ing (7) and (10) then we get  
 ̇̃      ̃      ̂.  (25) 
 
The time derivative of the auxiliary error-like signal      is  obtained as  
 ̇    ̈̃   ̇̃.  (26) 
 
Since   ̇̃      ̃ and using the time derivative of  ̇̃ (i .e. ,   ̈̃), we obtain the 
time derivative of      as 
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 ̇     ̇̃    ̇    ̇̂     ̃.  (27) 
 
since the time derivative of the observed message is required for (27), 
we obtain from (16) and (17) that  
  ̇̂                ̃  (28) 
where (23) was utilized.  Substituting (28) into (27) results in  
 ̇     ̇̃    ̇            ̃   ̃.  
(
(29) 
Before start ing the Lyapunov–based analysis, we introduce an 
auxiliary function, denoted by       ,  that will be utilized in the 
Lyapunov function 
       ∫     [ ̇         ( ̃   )]
 
 
    (30) 
 
where       is  a nonnegative constant .  It  can be shown that           
[36].  
Consider the following Lyapunov function  
    
 
 
 ̃  
 
 
    .  (31) 
 
Since           then        .  If  we take the derivative of this function, 
we get  
  ̇    ̃ ̇̃     ̇   ̇ 
     ̃          ̇̃ 
(32) 
 
where (23), (27) and time derivative of (30) were utilized.  
 
If  we recall  the equation (18) 
 ̇̃    ̃    ̃.    
 
Note that ,      is bounded since the original system is a modified chaotic 
system with       ̇   ,  and  ̈    being bounded. We also know that  ̃    
and    ̃    are square integrable.  These could be utilized along with the 
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right-hand side of (32) to show that   ̃̇     is  a square integrable.  
Mathematically,   
∫  ̇̃       
 
 
         (33) 
 
where        is a positive bounding constant.  
Utilizing the fact that           ,  we can obtain the following 
     ̃̇          ̃̇  .  (34) 
 
If  we use (34) along with (32), we get  
  ̇    ̃
              ̃̇  .  
 
(35) 
If we rearrange the above expression, we obtain 
 ̃               ̇     ̃̇
 .  (36) 
 
After integrating the above expression from 0 to t , we obtain  
∫  ̃      
 
 
      ∫        
 
 
  ∫   ̇     
 
 
  ∫   ̃̇       
 
 
 (37) 
 
We know that  ∫   ̇     
 
 
              ,  and after substitut ing this fact  
into (37), we obtain  
∫  ̃      
 
 
      ∫        
 
 
                 .  (38) 
 
Since       is  a positive function                     is always true, 
then 
∫  ̃      
 
 
      ∫        
 
 
             .  (39) 
 
We can separate (39) into two parts,  where the first  one is  
∫  ̃      
 
 
             (40) 
 
and the second one is  
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∫        
 
 
   
 
     
             (41) 
 
where     is required.  
As we can see from (40) and (41) it  is  clear that,   ̃    and      are 
square integrable . Since  ̃     and      are bounded and then from  (23), 
 ̇̃    is bounded as well.  Finally we can show that  ̇̃     ̇    are bounded. 
Thus, from Barbalat’s Lemma  [37],    ̃    and        as       .  Given 
the definition of     ,  we can conclude that   ̇̃      as       .  
Recall  the definition of  ̇̃    as in (25) 
 
 ̇̃     ̃      ̂ 
 
and since  ̇̃   ,   ̃      then i t is clear that       ̂    as       ,  thus 
reaching the objective.  
 
 S i m u l a t i o n  R e s u l t s  3.2.4.
 
In this section, we will provide numerical  simulation results. We 
choose the message as       
 
 
       
   
 
  where T = 10 seconds.  
Observer gains   and   are tuned by using self-tuning the algorithm 
proposed in [38],  [39]  and found as    13,0868 and    19,5921. Here 
we would like to note that the simulations were run for different values 
of   and  ,  and in all those runs, satisfactory performance was obtained.  
The numerical solutions were run for 4 different cases. In Case 1,  
perfect communication channel between the transmitter and the receiver 
is assumed (i .e., no distortions). In Case 2, the transmitted chaotic signal 
     is  considered to be subject to additive noise with an SNR of 10 dB. 
In Case 3, the transmitted chaotic signal      is considered to be 
perturbed by an additive sinusoidal disturbance. Finally in Case 4, a 
parametric uncertainty is considered by changing one parameter of the 
Lorenz System at  the receiver part.    
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Case 1:  The result of this simulation is shown in Figures 11-15. 
The message signal       is shown in  Figure 11, and the chaotic signal 
     is  demonstrated in  Figure 12.  Figure 13 shows       versus      and 
     versus     .  In Figure 14,  ̃    is shown which goes to 0 fast. The 
message signal      ,  recovered message signal   ̂    and the difference 
between original  message and recovered message   ̃    are shown in 
Figure 15. As can be seen in Figure 15(c) which is  ̃,  we recovered the 
message with reasonable accuracy. Also we can see from the result  ̃ 
goes to 0 so fast.  
 
Figure 11. Case 1:  The message signal       
 
 
Figure 12. Case 1:       
 
 
 31 
 
 
 
Figure 13.  Case 1: Chaotic attractors of Lorenz System. The above  
                 attractor is x versus y,  and the below one is y versus z.  
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Figure 14. Case 1:   ̃     
 
Figure 15. Case 1:      ,   ̂    and  ̃    for signum function  
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We simulated the system for 100 seconds . Although we showed 
     and      for 100 seconds to emphasize the a -periodicity of      and 
also how accurate  ̂    is,   ̃    is shown for 4 seconds to make i t clear 
how fast   ̃    goes to zero.  
We can show that our nonlinear observer works for high frequency 
sinusoidal signals.  If we do the simulation for the message signal as 
      
 
 
       
    
 
  where T = 10 seconds. Observer gains  are chosen as 
   97,0341 and    23,1679.  The message signal     ,  recovered 
message signal  ̂    and the difference between original  message and 
recovered message  ̃    are shown in the Figure 16.  
 
Figure 16. Case 1:    ,   ̂    and  ̃    for high frequency signum function  
 
Case 2: It was assumed that the transmission channel was noise -
free case 1. In this section, the message signal is transmitted to the 
receiver via a noisy channel.  The channel type is Additive White 
Gaussian Noise (AWGN) which adds white Gaussian noise to the signal 
that passes through i t.  The relative power of noise in an AWGN channel 
is described by a Signal -to-Noise Ratio (SNR) value. It  is assumed that 
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SNR value is 10 dB for this channel. The same observer gains are used 
for this simulation. Simulation results are shown in Figure 17 and Figure 
18. In Figure 17, the observer error for      ( i .e.,   ̃   ) and, in Figure 18, 
the transmitted message, the recovered message and the message 
observer error are given. As you can see from the Figures, while there is 
an increase at the error signal, the message signal is recovered within a 
good precision. However if SNR value increases then it  would be tough 
to detect the message signal .   
 
Figure 17. Case 2:   ̃    for AWGN channel  
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Figure 18. Case 2:     ,   ̂    and  ̃    for AWGN channel  
 
Case 3:  In this case, the transmission channel is assumed to 
impose an addit ive sinusoidal disturbance as        
   
 
  where T = 30 
seconds. After the transmitted signal      is sent to the receiver part , it  is  
summed by this disturbance (i. e.,      obtained at the receiver part is 
equal to             
   
 
 ).  The simulation results are shown in Figure 19 
and Figure 20. In Figure 19, the observer error  ̃    and, in Figure 20, the 
transmitted message, the recovered message and the message observer 
error are given. As you can see from the Figures, while there is an 
increase at the error signal, the message signal is recovered within a 
good precision. However if the amplitude of the sinusoidal disturbance 
increases then it would be tough to detect  the message signal.  
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Figure 19. Case 3:   ̃    for additive noise channel
Figure 20.  Case 3:      ,   ̂    and  ̃    for additive noise channel  
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Case 4:  Besides noise and additive disturbances , there can also be 
uncertainty at the system parameters.  As mentioned  before,  the system 
parameters were  chosen as   = 10,   = 28 and   = 8/3.  We now change 
one of the system parameters at the receiver part by choosing   = 10.5. 
The simulation results for this scenario are shown in Figure 21 and 
Figure 22. In Figure 20, the observer error  ̃    and, in Figure 21, the 
transmitted message, the recovered message and the message observer 
error are given. As you can see from the Figures, while there is an 
increase at the error signal, the message signal is recovered within a 
good precision. However if the change at  the parameters increases or all 
three system parameters are quite d ifferent then it would be tough to 
detect the message signal.  
 
Figure 21. Case 4:   ̃    for parametric uncertainty case  
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Figure 22. Case 4:      ,   ̂    and  ̃    for parametric uncertainty case  
 
 H y p e r b o l i c  T a n g e n t  V e r s i o n  o f  t h e  3.3.
O b s e r v e r  i n  S e c t i o n  3 . 2  
 
Recall  that  in the design of  ̂    we used       ̃ .  As extensively 
discussed in the literature,  hyperbolic tangent function is an 
approximation of the signum function. See  Figure 22 for signum and 
tangent hyperbolic functions. Mathematically, it  is possible to say that , 
hyperbolic tangent function for large   is  a smooth approximation of the 
signum function is in the sense that  
 
     ̃         ̃ .  (42) 
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(a)                                                 (b)   
Figure 23. (a) Signum Function, (b) Tanh Function for  =1 
 
This motivated us to design hyperbolic tangent function version of 
the observer as  
 ̂         [ ̃      ̃     ∫  ̃     
 
 
]    ∫     
 
 
  ̃        (43) 
 
where  ̃   ,   ̃    and  ̃    were designed the same as the signum observer  
(13), (14) and (15). Notice that the       ̃  term in our new observer is 
not a close approximation of the      ̃  as the constant multiplying  ̃ in 
     () is equal to 1.  This causes the need for stability analysis to be 
modified for this new observer.   
Specifically,  we need to modify      in (30) as 
        ∫     [ ̇            ̃    ]
 
 
   (44) 
and nonnegativeness of this term must be ensured. In  [40], it  was proven 
that , after satisfying a high gain condition by  ,  and when | ̃   |       for 
some small      ,  then        and when | ̃   |      then        is not 
valid anymore. As a result  it  is  possible to drive  ̃ to a small  value.  A 
comprehensive analysis was given in [40] . 
The observer gains    and   are tuned by using the algorithm 
proposed in  [41] and found as   = 13,2245 and   = 18,1966. If we 
simulate our system with the new observer in (43) (i.e.,  hyperbolic 
tangent function) we obtain  ̃    as in Figure 24, and     ,   ̂    and  ̃    
for hyperbolic tangent function are shown in Figure 25.  
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Figure 24. Tanh observer:  Case 1:   ̃     
 
Figure 25. Tanh observer:  Case 1:    ,   ̂    and  ̃     
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As can be seen from the Figures 24-25, changes at  the observer 
that  is done resulted in no difference at the simulation results.  
Simulation results for AWGN channel,  additive noise channel and 
parametric uncertainty cases are shown in following Figures.  
 
Figure 26. Tanh observer:  Case 2:      ,   ̂    and  ̃     
 
 42 
 
 
Figure 27. Tanh observer:  Case 3:       ,   ̂    and  ̃    
 
Figure 28. Tanh observer:  Case 4:      ,   ̂    and  ̃     
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 S a t u r a t i o n  F u n c t i o n  V e r s i o n  o f  t h e  3.4.
O b s e r v e r  i n  S e c t i o n  3 . 2  
 
Alternatively,      ̃  can be approximated by the function 
saturation      ̃  in the design of   ̂   .  As broadly discussed in the 
literature, saturation function is another approximation of the signum 
function. See Figure 29 for signum and saturation functions .  There is a 
smooth approximation of the saturation function for small    
 
     ̃       ̃   .  (45) 
 
The new observer design is given as  
 ̂         [ ̃      ̃     ∫  ̃     
 
 
]    ∫     
 
 
 ̃         (46) 
 
where   = 1,  and  ̃   ,   ̃    and  ̃    were designed the same as  (13),(14)  
and (15).  
The observer gains   and   are tuned by using a similar  algorithm 
to that of [41] and found as   = 13,2038 and   = 19,2507. If we simulate 
our system with these new observer in (46)  (i.e. , saturation function) ,  
we obtain  ̃    as in Figure 30-34. Simulation results for AWGN channel, 
additive noise channel and parametric uncertainty cases are shown in 
following Figures.  
 
 
(a)                                                 (b)   
Figure 29. (a) Signum Function, (b) Saturation Function  where   = 1 
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Figure 30. Sat observer: Case 1:  ̃    
 
Figure 31. Sat observer: Case 1:     ,   ̂    and  ̃     
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Figure 32. Sat observer: Case 2:     ,   ̂    and  ̃   
Figure 33. Sat observer: Case 3:      ,   ̂    and  ̃     
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Figure 34. Sat observer: Case 4:      ,   ̂    and  ̃     
 
Finally,  we compare these three novel nonlinear observers  by 
calculation the squared error during the simulation run via the formu la;  
∫  ̃    
   
 
    (47) 
The observers are compared for case 2 where  the transmission channel is 
disturbed by AWGN with 10 dB SNR. When above expression yielded  
28.1321, 28.0289, and 28.0244, for the signum function, tanh function, 
sat function based observers, respectively .  It  is  clear that all  three 
observers performed similarly.   
 
 N u c l e a r  S i m u l a t i o n  3.5.
 
In [42], it  is stated that [direct quote] “Secure long-distance 
monitoring of plant data is  becoming inc reasingly important for safe and 
efficient operation of nuclear power plants.”  Instead of using a 
sinusoidal  signal of the form       
 
 
       
   
 
  as the message signal ,  
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we take a signal from the following reduced-order Boiling Water Reactor 
model [42] is considered as an example of MOS:  
 
[
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 (48) 
 
as the message signal. In (48),      is excess neutron population 
normalized to the steady-state neutron density and is chosen as the 
message signal to be encrypted. Other states are     ,      ,       and     .  
Model parameters of the reactor are given in Table 2.   
 
Model Parameters  Values Model Parameters  Values 
   25.04   -2.52 x 10
-5  
   0.23   0.0056 
   2.25    4 x 10
-5  
   6.82   0.08 
   4.2 x 10
-3  
  
Table 2.  Model Parameters for Nuclear Simulation [43]  
 
Firstly,  by utilizing the information in [43], we tried to obtain a replica 
of the results in [42]. As can be seen in  
Figure 35, the message signal of      obtained in Matlab Simulink is 
exactly same shown as the one in [42].  
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Figure 35. The message signal   (t), obtained from Matlab (top) and from  
                [42] (bottom). 
 
After obtaining the  signal     ,  it  is  used as the message signa l for 
our Lorenz Chaotic System. Simulations are run for all three observers ,  
separately.  The observer gains were same as the previous values.   
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Figure 36. Nuclear simulation for the signum observer: The above figure  
                is      (where          ),   ̂    and the below one is   ̃    for 
                signum function  
 
As can be seen at the Figure 36(c) the difference between the 
transmitted message and the received message goes zero fast.   
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Figure 37. Nuclear simulation for the tanh observer:  The above figure is   
                     (where          ),   ̂    and the below one is   ̃    
 
Nuclear simulation is run with the hyperbolic tangent function 
version and the results are shown in Figure 37. As can be seen in Figure 
37(c),  ̃    goes zero fast .   
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Figure 38. Nuclear simulation for saturation function. The above figure  
                is      (where          ),   ̂    and the below one is   ̃   .  
 
Nuclear simulation is run for the last observer which is saturation 
function version, and  ̃    goes zero fast  for this observer,  as can be seen 
from Figure 38(c).  
 
 S e c u r i t y  A n a l y s i s  o f  O u r  S y s t e m  3.6.
 
In his book [44], Tao-Yang defines the relationship and difference 
between classical cryptography and chaotic cryptography as [direct  
quote] “In classical cryptology, the cryptography is a systematic science 
with well-established analytical and synthetic principles, and the 
cryptanalysis is rather like  an art depending heavily on intuition and 
experience than a science. Also, chaotic cryptography has been 
developed rapidly in recent years while chaotic cryptanalysis is still  at  
its beginning with very few results lit tered among a huge ocean of 
chaotic cryptography literature.”  In this point of view, the differences 
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and the similarities between classical cryptography and chao tic 
cryptography, and also advantages and disadvantages between them are 
going to be analyzed in this section. Detailed information about 
cryptography can be found in [45], [46].  It is  possible to find numerous 
papers in the l iterature about cryptanalysis of chaos -based 
communication methods  [19], [47], [48], [49], [50], [51],  [52], [53],  
[54], [55], [56].  
There are mainly three possible ways to break a cryptosystem;  
 Transmitted ciphertext signal is  used for re -assembling the 
message signal.  
 The message signal can be recovered by extracting the 
chaotic carrier signal by the difference between transmitted 
ciphertext signal and extracted chaoti c carrier signal.  
 Transmitted signal is used for estimating the key (or secret) 
parameters.  [19]  
Although chaotic communication is  considered as  secure,  there are 
some ways to decode the message signal despite the lack of parameter 
values, keys or exact knowledge of the system that is used. Specifically,  
in [49], two different algorithms to break the cryptosystems using 
Lorenz’s attractors are presented. These algorithms, namely Power 
Analysis Attack and Generalized Synchronization Attack, are used to 
examine the security our observer design. 
 
 P o w e r  A n a l y s i s  A t t a c k  3.6.1.
 
The Lorenz System in [49] is simulated and obtained that the 
algorithm breaks the chaotic system as shown in Figure 39. The 
algorithm starts by squaring the ciphertext signal      ,  then low pass-
filtering of this squared ciphertext signal, and finally, binary 
quantization is applied to this signal. The low-pass filter is a four pole 
Butterfly filter with a cutoff frequency of 0.5 Hz. Smith-Trigger is then 
used as a quantizer with switch on point at 85 and switch off point at 5. 
These points are different from [49] to obtain better recovered plaintext.  
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As you can see in the Figure 39, the plaintext is recovered (with some 
shift on the time domain) without the knowledge of the kind of the 
system [49]  that was used for encryption, and neither  its parameters and 
nor its keys.   
If  we apply the same scheme to signum function observer , we get 
the results in Figure 40. As you can see, the recovered message signal 
(plaintext) is not the t ime shifted version of the original message. 
Although we change switch point s, we do not get the transmitted 
plaintext as  the recovered plaintext. Th is shows that the algorithm break 
the system in [49] does not work for our system.  
 
 
Figure 39. Message signal (plaintext) ,      (ciphertext),        (squared 
                ciphertext signal),  low-pas filtered      ,  recovered plaintext  
                from above to below.  
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Figure 40. Power Analysis Attack applied to our signum function  
                observer system. Message signal (plain text ),       (ciphertext  
                of our system),       (squared ciphertext signal), low-pas  
                filtered      ,  recovered plaintext from above to below.  
 
 G e n e r a l i z e d  S y n c h r o n i z a t i o n  A t t a c k  3.6.2.
 
In [49], the second way of breaking a chaotic communication system 
is based on the knowledge of the kind of chaotic system is used for 
encryption, but sti ll  lack of knowing neither its parameters nor initial 
condition values. This algorithm starts with calculating the d ifference 
between      and  ̂   ,  second step is multiplying      by  ̃      ̂        ,  
then multiplied signal is low-pass fi ltered and, finally,  a binary 
quantizer is used to re -generate the original  message signal  (plaintext). 
Switch on point  was at 11, switch off po int was at 9 for this attack. The 
simulation results for the given system are shown in Figure 41. 
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Figure 41. Message signal (plain text),      (ciphertext),       multiplied  
                by  ̃   ,  low-pass filtered version of the multiplied signal,  
                recovered plaintext from above to below.  
 
As can be seen in Figure 41, recovered plaintext is time shifted version 
of the original plaintext. So the algorithm works for this system. If we 
apply this security algorithm to our system and make the simulations 
again, we get the Figure 42.  
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Figure 42. Generalized Synchronization Attack  for our signum function  
                observer system. Message signal (plain text),       (ciphertext),  
                     multiplied by  ̃   ,  low-pass filtered version of the  
                multiplied signal, recovered plaintext from above to below.  
 
As shown in Figure 42 the recovered message signal (plaintext) is 
not similar the original message. Although we change switch point s, we 
do not get the transmitted plaintext as  the recovered plaintext. That 
shows us this algorithm to break the system does not work for our 
system.  
Although these two algorithms did not break our observer design, 
we believe that our system must be tested extensively by other 
algorithms in the literature.   
 
 S u m m a r y  3.7.
 
In this  chapter, after giving the General  Lorenz System, we 
proposed a nonlinear observer for the Lorenz Chaotic System described 
in Section 3.2. Observer design and stability analysis of this system are 
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provided and also we presented our simulation results via Matlab 
Simulink where robustness to the channel imperfections were also 
demonstrated. In Sections 3.3 and 3.4, we change our observer design by 
replacing the signum function with hyperbolic tangent and saturation 
functions, respectively. In Section 3.5,  we showed that our observer 
works not only for a sinusoidal message signal but also a signal 
generated by a dynamical system (i.e. ,  a nuclear reactor model) via 
simulations. In section 3.6,  we applied some decryption methods from 
the literature to our observer and tested i ts security.   
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C HA PT E R  4  
 
C ON C L U S I ON  
 
In this thesis, chaotic communication was studied. An observer -
based approach was followed to extract message encrypted in a chaotic 
signal. Specifically, a message signal was considered to be added to the 
dynamics of the Lorenz chaotic system which served as  the transmitter.  
The output of the transmitter was considered as the input to the receiver 
which was a replica of the Lorenz chaotic system on the transmitter side.  
An observer was designed to obtain the states of the Lorenz chaotic 
system and a novel nonlinear observer was designed to estimate the 
message signal. Stability of the closed -loop system was investigated via 
Lyapunov-based arguments and convergence of the error signals to zero 
was proven.  In addition, after modifications to the nonlinear argum ent 
in the message observer, two nonlinear observers were proposed.  
To demonstrate the performance of the proposed observers,  
extensive numerical simulations were performed. Robustness to 
imperfectnesses such as additive noise, additive perturbations and 
parametric uncertainties were shown numerically. For a real -world 
scenario, we considered the dynamic model of a BWR and one of its 
states was treated as the message signal to be encrypted. This case was 
also simulated and satisfactory performance was obta ined.  
Finally,  we investigated the security level of our observer.  Two 
algorithms designed for a Lorenz chaotic system were considered. These 
algorithms were tried to break the cryptosystem in our observer. After 
several numerical tries our observer was not to broken.  
There is much to be considered as future work. The main 
difference of the observer design in this thesis from the existing 
literature is that it  is Lyapunov-based. As a result, the analysis can be 
fused with adaptive algorithms to enhance ro bustness to parametric 
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uncertainties. Generalizing the observer in this thesis to be applicable to 
various other chaotic systems may also be an interesting future work.  
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